

Conditional Restricted Boltzmann Machines for Negotiations in Highly Competitive and Complex Domains

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Abstract

Learning in automated negotiations, while useful, is hard because of the indirect way the target function can be observed and the limited amount of experience available to learn from. This paper proposes two novel opponent modeling techniques based on deep learning methods. Moreover, to improve the learning efficacy of negotiating agents, the second approach is also capable of transferring knowledge efficiently between negotiation tasks. Transfer is conducted by automatically mapping the source knowledge to the target in a rich feature space. Experiments show that using these techniques the proposed strategies outperform existing state-of-the-art agents in highly competitive and complex negotiation domains. Furthermore, the empirical game theoretic analysis reveals the robustness of the proposed strategies.

1 Introduction

In automated negotiation two (or more) intelligent agents try to come to a joint agreement in a consumer-provider or buyer-seller setup [Jennings *et al.*, 2001]. One of the biggest driving forces behind research into agent-based negotiation is the broad spectrum of potential applications, for example, the applications of automated negotiation include their deployment for service allocation, to information markets, in business process management and electronic commerce, etc.

The driving force of an (opposing) agent is governed by its hidden preferences (or utility function) through its hidden negotiation strategy. Since both the preferences and bidding strategy of agents are hidden, we will use the term opponent model to encompass both as the force governing agents' behavior in negotiation afterwards. By exploiting the preferences and/or strategy of opposing agents, better final (or cumulative) agreement terms can be reached [Faratin *et al.*, 2002; Lopes *et al.*, 2008]. However, learning an opposing agent's model is hard since: 1) the preference can only be observed indirectly through the negotiation exchanges, 2) the absence of prior information about an opponent, and 3) the confinement of the interaction number/time in a single negotiation session. These challenges become tougher when highly competitive and complex negotiation domains are adopted.

Such a class of negotiation domains is targeted in this work. These share the following properties: 1) a large outcome space (i.e., at least in thousands of possible agreements), 2) strong opposition between the parties, 3) absence of knowledge about opponent preferences and strategies, 4) negotiation being executed in a real-time setting with a fixed deadline, 5) payoff being discounted over time, and 6) the private reservation value (or the utility of conflict) by each party, which provides an agent with an alternative solution when no mutually acceptable agreement can be found, and potentially increases the likelihood of failing to reach a contract.

Opponent modeling is essential for the performance quality in automated negotiations [Rubinstein, 1982]. This is typically achieved by using machine learning techniques tailored to suit the negotiation scenario. For example, [Lin *et al.*, 2008] introduce a reasoning model based on decision making and belief updating mechanism which allows the identification of the opponent profile from a set of publicly available profiles. [Brzostowski and Kowalczyk, 2006] investigate online prediction of future counter-offers by using differentials, thereby assuming that the opponent strategy is fixed using a weighted combination of time- and behavior-dependent tactics introduced in [Faratin *et al.*, 1998]. [Carbonneau *et al.*, 2008] use a three-layer artificial neural network to predict future counter-offers in a specific domain, but the training process is not on-line and requires a large amount of previous encounters. Although successful, these works suffer from restrictive assumptions on the structure and/or overall shape of the sought function, making them only applicable in domains with low complexity.

With the development of Genius [Hindriks *et al.*, 2009] and the popularity of the negotiation competition – ANAC [Fujita *et al.*, 2013; Baarslag *et al.*, 2013], recent work has started to focus on learning opponent strategies in more challenging domains. [Williams *et al.*, 2011] apply Gaussian processes to predict the opponent's future concession. The resulting information can be used profitably by the agent to set the concession rate accordingly. [Chen and Weiss, 2012] propose the OMAC strategy, which learns the opponent's strategy to adjust negotiation moves in an attempt to maximize its own benefit. Learning the opponent's model is achieved through wavelets and cubic smoothing splines. Then, a fast learning strategy proposed in [Chen *et al.*, 2013] employs sparse pseudo-input Gaussian processes to lower the computational

cost of modeling the behavior of unknown negotiating opponents in complex environments.

Even though such algorithms have shown successful results in various negotiation scenarios, they inherit a problem shared by all the above methods. That is the omission of knowledge reuse. The problem of opponent modeling is tough due to the lack of enough information about the opponent. Knowledge re-use in the form of transfer can serve as a potential solution for such a challenge. Transfer is substantially more complex than simply using the previous history encountered by the agent. Since for instance, the knowledge for a target agent can potentially arrive from a different source agent negotiating in a different domain, in which case a mapping to correctly configure such knowledge is needed. Transfer is of great value for a target negotiation agent in a new domain. The agent can use this “additional” information to learn about and adapt to new domains more quickly, thus producing more efficient strategies.

Tackling the above challenges, this paper contributes by:

- Constructing “negotiation-tailored” conditional restricted Boltzmann machines (CRBMs) as algorithms for opponent modeling.
- Extending CRBMs by an additional layer allowing for knowledge transfer from possibly multiple source tasks.
- Proposing two novel negotiation strategies based on: (1) CRBMs, and (2) Transfer-CRBMs.

Experiments performed on eight highly competitive and complex negotiation domains, show that the proposed strategies outperform state-of-the-art negotiation agents by a significant margin. This leading gap is enlarged when using the transfer strategy. Furthermore, an empirical game theoretic analysis show that the proposed strategies are robust, where other agents have an incentive to deviate towards them.

2 Conditional Restricted Boltzmann Machines

This work adopts conditional restricted Boltzmann machines (CRBMs) as the basis for opponent modeling, which is in turn used for determining a negotiation strategy. In this section, the CRBMs including their update rules are explained.

Conditional restricted Boltzmann machines (CRBMs), introduced in [Taylor and Hinton, 2009], are rich probabilistic models used for structured output predictions. CRBMs include three layers: (1) history, (2) hidden, and (3) present layers. These are connected via a three-way weight tensor among them. CRBMs are formalized using an energy function. Given an input data set, these machines learn by fitting the weight tensor such that the energy function is minimized. Although successful in modeling different time series data [Taylor and Hinton, 2009; Mnih *et al.*, 2011], full CRBMs are computationally expensive to learn. Their learning algorithm, contrastive divergence (CD), incurs a complexity of $\mathcal{O}(N^3)$. Therefore a factored version, the factored conditional restricted Boltzmann machines (FCRBM), has been proposed in [Taylor and Hinton, 2009]. FCRBM factors the three-way weight tensor among the layers, reducing the com-

plexity to $\mathcal{O}(N^2)$. Next the mathematical details will be explained.

2.1 Probability and Energy Model

Define $\mathcal{V}_{<t} = [v_{<t}^{(1)}, \dots, v_{<t}^{(n_1)}]$, with n_1 being the number of units in the history layer. Further, define $\mathcal{H}_t = [h_t^{(1)}, \dots, h_t^{(n_2)}]$, with n_2 being the number of nodes in the hidden layer. Finally, define $\mathcal{V}_t = [v_t^{(1)}, \dots, v_t^{(n_3)}]$, with n_3 being the number of units in the present layer.

In automated negotiation the inputs are typically continuous. Therefore, for the history and present layers, a Gaussian distribution is adopted, with a sigmoidal distribution for the hidden.

The visible and hidden units joint probability distribution is given by:

$$p(\mathcal{V}_t, \mathcal{H}_t | \mathcal{V}_{<t}, \mathbf{W}) = \exp \left(\frac{-E(\mathcal{V}_t, \mathcal{H}_t | \mathcal{V}_{<t}, \mathbf{W})}{Z} \right)$$

with the factored energy function determined using:

$$E(\mathcal{V}_t, \mathcal{H}_t | \mathcal{V}_{<t}, \mathbf{W}) = - \sum_i \frac{(v_t^{(i)} - a^{(i)})^2}{\sigma_i^2} - \sum_j h_t^{(j)} b^{(j)} - \sum_f \left(\sum_i \mathbf{W}_{if}^{\mathcal{V}_t} \frac{v_t^{(i)}}{\sigma_i} \sum_j \mathbf{W}_{jf}^{\mathcal{H}_t} h_t^{(j)} \sum_k \mathbf{W}_{kf}^{\mathcal{V}_{<t}} \right)$$

where Z is the potential function, f is the number of factors used for factoring the three-way weight tensor among the layers, and σ_i is the variance of the Gaussian distribution in the history layer. Furthermore, $\mathbf{W}_{if}^{\mathcal{V}_t}$, $\mathbf{W}_{jf}^{\mathcal{H}_t}$, and $\mathbf{W}_{kf}^{\mathcal{V}_{<t}}$ are the factored tensor weights of the history, hidden, and present layer, respectively. Finally, $a^{(i)}$ and $b^{(j)}$ are the biases of the history and hidden layers, respectively.

2.2 Inference in the Model

Since there are no connections between the nodes of the same layer, inference is done parallel for each of them. The values of the j^{th} hidden unit and the i^{th} visible unit are, respectively, defined as follows:

$$s_{j,t}^{\mathcal{H}} = \sum_f \mathbf{W}_{jf}^{\mathcal{H}} \sum_i \mathbf{W}_{if}^{\mathcal{V}_t} \frac{v_t^{(i)}}{\sigma_i} \sum_k \mathbf{W}_{kf}^{\mathcal{V}_{<t}} \frac{v_{<t}^{(k)}}{\sigma_k} + b^{(j)}$$

$$s_{i,t}^{\mathcal{V}} = \sum_f \mathbf{W}_{if}^{\mathcal{V}} \sum_j \mathbf{W}_{jf}^{\mathcal{H}} h_t^{(j)} \sum_k \mathbf{W}_{kf}^{\mathcal{V}_{<t}} \frac{v_{<t}^{(k)}}{\sigma_k} + a^{(i)}$$

These are then substituted to determine the activation probabilities of each of the hidden and visible units as:

$$p(h_t^{(j)}) = 1 | \mathcal{V}_t, \mathcal{V}_{<t} = \text{sigmoid}(s_{j,t}^{\mathcal{H}})$$

$$p(v_t^{(i)}) = x | \mathcal{H}_t, \mathcal{V}_{<t} = \mathcal{N}(s_{i,t}^{\mathcal{V}}, \sigma_i^2)$$

2.3 Learning in the Model

Learning in the full model means to update the weights when data is available. This is done using persistence contrastive

divergence proposed in [Mnih *et al.*, 2011]. The update rules for each of the factored weights are:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta \mathbf{W}_{if}^{\mathcal{V}} &\propto \sum_t \left(\left\langle v_t^{(i)} \sum_k \mathbf{W}_{kf}^{\mathcal{V}_{<t}} v_{<t}^{(k)} \sum_j \mathbf{W}_{jf}^{\mathcal{H}} h_t^{(j)} \right\rangle_0 \right. \\
&\quad \left. - \left\langle v_t^{(i)} \sum_k \mathbf{W}_{kf}^{\mathcal{V}_{<t}} v_{<t}^{(k)} \sum_j \mathbf{W}_{jf}^{\mathcal{H}} h_t^{(j)} \right\rangle_K \right) \\
\Delta \mathbf{W}_{jf}^{\mathcal{H}} &\propto \sum_t \left(\left\langle h_t^{(j)} \sum_k \mathbf{W}_{kf}^{\mathcal{V}_{<t}} v_{<t}^{(k)} \sum_i \mathbf{W}_{if}^{\mathcal{V}} v_t^{(i)} \right\rangle_0 \right. \\
&\quad \left. - \left\langle h_t^{(j)} \sum_k \mathbf{W}_{kf}^{\mathcal{V}_{<t}} v_{<t}^{(k)} \sum_i \mathbf{W}_{if}^{\mathcal{V}} v_t^{(i)} \right\rangle_K \right) \\
\Delta \mathbf{W}_{kf}^{\mathcal{V}_{<t}} &\propto \sum_t \left(\left\langle v_{<t}^{(k)} \sum_i \mathbf{W}_{if}^{\mathcal{V}_{<t}} v_t^{(i)} \sum_j \mathbf{W}_{jf}^{\mathcal{H}} h_t^{(j)} \right\rangle_0 \right. \\
&\quad \left. - \left\langle v_{<t}^{(k)} \sum_i \mathbf{W}_{if}^{\mathcal{V}_{<t}} v_t^{(i)} \sum_j \mathbf{W}_{jf}^{\mathcal{H}} h_t^{(j)} \right\rangle_K \right) \\
\Delta a^{(i)} &\propto \sum_t (\langle v_t^{(i)} \rangle_0 - \langle v_t^{(i)} \rangle_K) \\
\Delta b^{(j)} &\propto \sum_t (\langle h_t^{(j)} \rangle_0 - \langle h_t^{(j)} \rangle_K)
\end{aligned}$$

where $\langle \cdot \rangle_0$ is the data distribution expectation and $\langle \cdot \rangle_K$ is the reconstructed distribution after K -steps sampled through a Gibbs sampler from a Markov chain starting at the original data set.

3 The Negotiation Strategies

In this section the details of the proposed negotiation strategies are explained. First an overview of the basic strategy is presented in Algorithm 1 and then detailed in Section 3.1. Please note, that the machine used in this work is FCRBM, but we mention it as CBRM for convenience. The strategy using that technique is named *CRMB*. To enable transfer between different negotiation tasks, *CRMB* is then extended to the strategy *TCRMB*, which applies the transfer mechanism given in Section 3.2.

Due to space limitations, we only discuss the core concepts of the proposed strategies, and omit the introduction of bilateral negotiation protocol/model on purpose. Those details are given in a long version of this work.

3.1 CRMB Strategy

Upon receiving a new counter-offer from the opponent, the agent records the time stamp t_c , the utility of the latest offer proposed by the agent $u_{own}^{(l)}$ and the utility, u_{rec} , in accordance with the agent's own utility function (line 3 of Algorithm 1). Since the agent may encounter a large amount of data in a single session, the *CRMB* is trained every short period (interval) to guarantee its robustness and effectiveness in the real-time environments. The number of equal intervals is denoted by ζ .

In order to optimize its payoff of a negotiation, the agent using *CRMB* predicts what is the optimal utility could be obtained from the opponent, u_{rec}^* , by training the conditional restricted Boltzmann machine, as shown in line 6 of Algorithm 1. To this end, i.e. maximizing the received utility (u_{rec})

Algorithm 1 The overall framework of the *CRMB* strategy.

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1: Require: Maximum time allowed for the negotiation
    $t_{\max}$ , the current time  $t_c$ , the utility of the latest offer
   proposed by the agent  $u_{own}^{(l)}$ , the utility of a counter-offer
   received from the opponent  $u_{rec}$ ,  $u_{\tau}$  is the utility of an
   new offer to be proposed. The discounting factor  $\delta$ , the
   reservation value  $\theta$ ,  $\mathbf{W}$  the trained weight tensor and  $\psi$  is
   the record of past information of this negotiation session.
2: while  $t_c < t_{\max}$  do
3:    $u_{rec} \leftarrow receiveMessage();$ 
4:    $\psi \leftarrow record((t_c, u_{own}^{(l)}, u_{rec});$ 
5:   if  $isNewInterval(t_c)$  then
6:      $\mathbf{W} = trainFCRMB(\psi);$ 
7:      $(t^*, u_{own}^*, u_{rec}^*) \leftarrow predict(\psi, \mathbf{W});$ 
8:      $u_{\tau} \leftarrow getTargetUtility(t_c, \psi, \mathbf{W}, t^*, u_{own}^*, u_{rec}^*);$ 
9:   end if
10:  if  $isAcceptable(t_c, u_{\tau}, u_{rec}, \delta, \theta)$  then
11:     $agree();$ 
12:  else
13:     $proposeNewOffer(u_{\tau});$ 
14:  end if
15: end while
16: the negotiation ends without an agreement being reached

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from the opponent, the agent should attempt to find when to make the optimal concession that maximizes:

$$\max_{t, u_{own}} u_{rec} = \max_{t, u_{own}} \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2) \quad (1)$$

$$\text{s.t. } t \leq T_{\max} \quad (2)$$

where $\mu = \sum_{ij} \mathbf{W}_{ij1} v^{(i)} h^{(j)} + c^{(1)}$ being the mean of the Gaussian distribution of the node in the present layer of the Boltzmann machine. In other words, the output of the CRBM on the present layer is the predicted utility, u_{rec} , of the opponent. To solve the maximization problem of Equation 2, the Lagrange multiplier technique is used. Namely, the above problem is transformed to the following:

$$\max_{t, u_{own}} J(t, u_{own}) \quad (3)$$

where $J(t, u_{own}) = \left[\mathcal{N} \left(\sum_{ij} \mathbf{W}_{ij1} v^{(i)} h^{(j)} + c^{(1)}, \sigma^2 \right) - \lambda(T_{\max} - t) \right]$. The derivatives of Equation 3 with respect to t and u_{own} are calculated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial}{\partial t} J(t, u_{own}) &= \frac{(u_{rec} - \mu) \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)}{2\sigma^2} \left[\sum_j \mathbf{W}_{1j1} h^{(j)} \right] \\
\frac{\partial}{\partial u_{own}} J(t, u_{own}) &= \frac{(u_{rec} - \mu) \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)}{2\sigma^2} \left[\sum_j \mathbf{W}_{2j1} h^{(j)} \right]
\end{aligned}$$

These derivatives are then used by gradient ascent to maximize Equation 3. The result is a point $\langle t^*, u_{own}^* \rangle$ that corresponds to u_{rec}^* . This process is indicted in line 7 of the algorithm.

Having obtained $\langle t^*, u_{own}^* \rangle$, the agent has now to decide on how to concede to t^* from t_c . [Williams *et al.*, 2011] adopted




Figure 1: High level schematic of the overall concession rate determination.

a linear concession strategy. However, such a scheme potentially omits a lot of relevant information about the opponent's model. To overcome such a shortcoming, this work uses the functional (i.e., learnt by the CRBM) manifold in order to determine the concession rate over time. First, a vector of equally spaced time intervals between t^* and t_c is created. This vector is passed to the CRBM to predict a vector of relevant u_{rec} 's (i.e., phase one in Figure 1). Having attained u_{rec} , the machine runs backwards, denoted by phase two in Figure 1, (i.e., CD with fixing the present layer and reconstructing on the input) to find the optimal utility to offer at the current time t_c which is represented by u_τ (see line 8 of Algorithm 1). It is clear that the concession rate follows the manifold created by the factored three-way weight tensor, and thus follows the surface of the learnt function. Adopting the above scheme, the agent potentially reaches $\langle t^*, u_{own}^* \rangle$, which are used to attain u_{rec}^* such that the expected received utility can be maximized.

Given a utility (u_τ) to offer, the agent needs to validate whether the utility of the latest counter-offer is better than u_τ and the (discounted) reservation value, or whether it had been already proposed earlier by the agent. If either of the conditions is met, the agent accepts this counter-offer and an agreement is reached as shown in line 10 of Algorithm 1. Otherwise, the proposed method constructs a new offer which has a utility of u_τ . Furthermore, for negotiation efficiency, if u_τ drops below the value of the best counter-offer, the agent chooses that best counter-offer as its next offer, because such a proposal tends to well satisfy the expectation of the opponent, which will then be inclined to accept it.

3.2 Transfer Mechanism

Knowledge transfer has been an essential integrated part of different machine learning algorithms. The idea behind transferring knowledge is that a target agents when faced by new and unknown tasks, may benefit from the knowledge gathered by other agents in different source tasks. Opponent modeling in complex negotiations is a tough challenge mainly due to the lack of enough information about the opponent. Transfer learning is a well suited potential solution for such a problem. In this paper and to the best of our knowledge, the first successful attempts for transferring between different negoti-




Figure 2: Transfer CRBMs.

ation tasks are reported.

The overall transfer mechanism of *TCRMB* is shown in Figure 2. After learning in a source task, this knowledge is then mapped to the target. The mapping is manifested by the connections between the two tasks' hidden layers (Figure 2). This can be seen as an initialization of the target task machine using the source model. The intuition behind this idea is that even though the two tasks are different, they might have shared features. This relation is discovered using the weight connections between the hidden layers shown in Figure 2. To learn these weight connections contrastive divergence on the corresponding layers is performed. The weights are learnt such that the reconstruction error between these layers is minimized. It is worth pointing out that there is no need for the target hidden units to be same as these of the source. The following update rules for learning the weights are used:

$$\mathbf{W}_{ij}^{S \rightarrow T(\tau+1)} = \mathbf{W}_{ij}^{S \rightarrow T(\tau)} + \alpha \left(\langle h_S^{(i)} h_T^{(j)} \rangle_0 - \langle h_S^{(i)} h_T^{(j)} \rangle_K \right)$$

where, $\mathbf{W}^{S \rightarrow T}$ is the weight connection between the source negotiation task, S , and the target task T , τ is the iteration step of contrastive divergence, α is the learning rate, $\langle \cdot \rangle$ is the data distribution expectation and $\langle \cdot \rangle_K$ is the reconstructed distribution after K -steps sampled through a Gibbs sampler from a Markov chain starting at the original data set.

When the weights are attained, an initialization of the target task hidden layer using the source knowledge is available. This is used at the start of the negotiation to propose offers for the new opponent. The scheme in which these propositions occur is the same as explained previously in the case of no transfer. When additional target information is gained, it is used to train the target CRBM as in the normal case. It is worth noting, that this proposed transfer method is not restricted to one source task. On the contrary, multiple source tasks are equally applicable. Furthermore, such a transfer scheme is different from just using the history of the agent. The transferred knowledge can arrive from any other task as long as this information is mapped correctly to suit the target. This mapping is performed using the CD algorithm as described above.

Table 1: Overview of negotiation domains

Domain name	Number of issues	Number of values for each issue	Size of the outcome space
Energy	8	5	390,625
Travel	7	4-8	188,160
ADG	6	5	15,625
Music collection	6	3-6	4,320
Camera	6	3-5	3,600
Amsterdam party	5	4-7	3,024

The difference between *TCRMB* and *CRMB*, as seen in line 6 of Algorithm 1, lies in the initialization procedure of the three-way weight tensor at the start of the negotiation. In case of *TCRMB* the initialization is performed using the transferred knowledge from the source task(s), while in *CRMB* this is done using the standard method, where the weights are sampled from a uniform Gaussian distribution with a mean and standard deviation determined by the designer.

4 Experiments and Results

The performance evaluation was done with GENIUS, which is also used as a competition platform for the negotiation competition (ANAC). The assessment quality under which the performance of the proposed method was evaluated is the competition results in the tournament format. The comparison between the transfer and the non-transfer case is thoroughly experimented, more details are given in Section 4.2. Furthermore, an empirical game theoretic evaluation is used to study the robustness of the proposed methods (Section 4.3).

4.1 Experiment setup

As most of the domains created for ANAC 2012 are not competitive enough, it is not hard for both parties to arrive at a win-win solution. To make the testing scenarios more challenging, six large outcome space domains are chosen. The characteristics of these domains are over-viewed in Table 1. Based on the above, a number of different random scenarios are generated to meet the following two inequities resulting in strictly conflicting preferences between two parties:

$$\forall o_j, o'_j \in O, V_j^a(o_j) \geq V_j^a(o'_j) \Leftrightarrow V_j^b(o_j) \leq V_j^b(o'_j) \quad (4)$$

where V_j^a is the evaluation function of agent a for issue j , o_j and o'_j are different values for issue j .

$$\forall w_i^a, w_i^b, \Sigma_{i=1}^n |w_i^a - w_i^b| \leq 0.5 \quad (5)$$

where, w_i^a is the weight of issue j assigned to agent a .

Moreover, the discounting factor and the reservation value for each scenario are sampled from a uniform distribution, in the intervals $[0.5, 1]$ and $[0, 0.5]$, respectively. Furthermore, the selection of benchmarking agents is also a decisive factor to the quality of the evaluation. The eight finalists of the most recent competition (ANAC 2012) are therefore all included in the experiments. In addition the DragonAgent proposed in [Chen *et al.*, 2013] is introduced as an extra benchmark. The experiment ran 10 times for every scenario to assure that the results are statistically significant. For the transfer setting, *TCRMB* is provided with no knowledge beforehand. It can rather use up to n previous sessions encountered acting on

Table 2: Overall performance. The bounds are based on the 95% confidence interval.

Agent	Mean Score	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
TCRBMagent	0.534	0.522	0.545
CRBMagent	0.485	0.471	0.499
DragonAgent	0.474	0.448	0.499
AgentLG	0.466	0.443	0.488
BRAMAgent 2	0.465	0.443	0.487
OMACagent	0.456	0.438	0.472
CUHKAgent	0.447	0.425	0.467
TheNegotiator	0.429	0.415	0.442
IAMhaggler2012	0.408	0.391	0.427
AgentMR	0.387	0.376	0.399
Meta-Agent	0.373	0.355	0.390

the same side/role (e.g., buyer or seller), with n being the total number of opponents. The number of intervals (i.e., ζ) is set to 200. The hidden units in the CRBM and TCRBM are set to 20 and 30, respectively. A momentum of 0.9 as suggested in [Hinton, 2010] to increase the speed of learning is used. Furthermore, to avoid over-fitting, a weight-decay factor of 0.0002 (also used in [Hinton, 2010]) is adopted.

4.2 Competition results

Figure 3 depicts the experimental results for the six domains, where the six top agents (according to the overall performance, see Table 2) and the mean score of all agents are shown, with self-play performance also considered.

Some interesting observations emerged from these outcomes. First, CRBMagent performs quite well against those strong agents from ANAC. It is generally ranked top three, and achieves on average 9.2% more than the mean performance of all participants. Then, relying on the framework of the former, TCRBMagent significantly outperforms other competitors by taking advantage of knowledge transfer. Clearly, it is the leading agent in all domains. Specifically, its performance is 19.2% higher than the mean score obtained by all agents across the domains. Moreover, it gains an improvement of 10.2% over CRBMagent, the second best agent in the experiments, while being more stable (i.e., experiencing less variance). This is due to the effect of knowledge transfer, where such a scheme biased the proposition of the agent towards better bidding process. Additionally, the performance of CUHKAgent, the winner of ANAC 2012, is surprisingly below the average. It is mainly because the strong agents like CRBMagent, TCRBMagent, and DragonAgent cause a considerable impact to CUHKAgent in such complex and high competitive domains, thereby suppressing its scores dramatically. It also explains why the ranking given in Table 2 is different from the final results of ANAC 2012.

4.3 The Empirical Game theoretic analysis

So far, the strategy performance was studied from the usual mean-scoring perspective. This, however, does not reveal information about the robustness of these strategies. To address robustness appropriately, empirical game theory (EGT) analysis [Jordan *et al.*, 2007] is applied to the competition results. Here, we consider the best single-agent deviations as in [Williams *et al.*, 2011], where there is an incentive for one agent to unilaterally change the strategy in order to sta-




Figure 4: The deviation analysis for the six-player tournament setting in Energy. Each node shows a strategy profile and the strategy with the highest scoring one marked by a background color. The arrow indicates the statistically significant deviation between strategy profiles. The equilibria are the nodes with thicker border and no outgoing arrow.




Figure 3: Performance of the first six agents with the average score in each domain.

tistically improve its own profit. The aim of using EGT is to search for pure Nash equilibria in which no agent has an incentive to deviate from its current strategy. The abbreviation for each strategy is indicated by the bold letter in Table 2. A profile (node) in the resulting EGT graph is defined by the mixture of strategies used by the players in a tournament. However, analysis of the 11-agent tournaments with the full combination of strategies is far too large to visualize. This is because $\binom{|p|+|s|-1}{|p|} = \binom{21}{11} = 352,716$ distinct nodes (where $|p|$ is the number of players and $|s|$ is the number of strategies) to represent in a graph using the technique. Due to space constraints, the analysis of 6-agent tournament in which each agent can choose one of the top six strategies reported in Table 2 are performed. For brevity reasons, we prune the graph to highlight some interesting features. To this end, the same pruning technique as in [Baarslag *et al.*, 2013] was adopted. That is, only those nodes on the path leading to pure Nash equilibria, starting from an initial profile where all agent employ the same strategy or each agent use a different strategy are shown. Energy, as the largest domain, is selected as the target scenario. Under this EGT analysis, there exists only two pure Nash equilibria, represented by a thick border in Figure 4 as follows:

1. All agents use the same strategy – BRAMAgent 2.
2. Four agents use *TCRMB* and two agents use *CRMB*.

The first Nash equilibrium is one of the initial states, where the self-play performance of BRAMAgent 2 is pretty high so that no agent is motivated to deviate from the current state. No other profiles, however, are interested in switching to this profile. In contrast, the second equilibrium consisting of *TCRMB* and *CRMB* is of more interest, as it attracts all profiles except the first equilibrium state. In other words, for any non-Nash equilibrium strategy profile there exist a path of statistically significant deviations (i.e., strategy changes) that leads to this equilibrium. In the second equilibrium, there is no incentive for any agents to deviate from *TCRMB* to *CRMB*, as this will decrease their payoffs. The analysis reveals that the two proposed strategies are both robust.

5 Conclusions and Future Work

In this paper two novel opponent modeling techniques, relying on deep learning methods, for highly competitive and complex negotiations are proposed. Based on these, two novel negotiation strategies are developed. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, the first successful results of transfer in negotiation scenarios are reported. Experimental results show both proposed strategies to be successful and robust.

The proposed method might suffer from a well-known transfer-related problem – Negative transfer. We speculate that *TCRMB* might avoid negative transfer in this context due to the highly informative and robust feature extraction scheme, as well as the hidden layer mapping. Nonetheless, a more thorough analysis, as well as possible quantifications of negative transfer are interesting directions for future work. Furthermore, the computational complexity of the proposed methods can still be reduced by adopting different sparse techniques from machine learning.

Another interesting future direction is the extension of the proposed framework to concurrent negotiations. In such settings, the agent is negotiating against multiple opponents simultaneously. Transfer between these tasks can serve as a potential solution for optimizing the performance in each of the negotiation sessions.

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