

Knowing that, Knowing what, and Public Communication: Public Announcement Logic with K_v Operators*

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Abstract

In his seminal work [Plaza, 1989], Plaza proposed the public announcement logic (**PAL**), which is considered as the pilot logic in the field of dynamic epistemic logic. In the same paper, Plaza also introduced an interesting “know-value” operator K_v and listed a few valid formulas of **PAL**+ K_v . However, it is unknown that whether these formulas, on top of the axioms for **PAL**, completely axiomatize **PAL**+ K_v . In this paper, we first give a negative answer to this open problem. Moreover, we generalize the K_v operator and show that in the setting of **PAL**, replacing the K_v operator with its generalized version does not increase the expressive power of the resulting logic. This suggests that we can simply use the more flexible generalization instead of the original **PAL**+ K_v . As the main result, we give a complete proof system for **PAL** plus the generalized operator based on a complete axiomatization of epistemic logic with the same operator in the single-agent setting.

Key words: public announcement logic, know-value operator, modal logic, multi-agent system

1 Introduction

As originally proposed in [Von Wright, 1951; Hintikka, 1962], classic epistemic logic (**EL**) focuses on *propositional knowledge* of agents, expressed as *knowing that* p . Such formalism of knowledge turns out to be very successful in the research of AI and theoretical computer science, demonstrated by the widely use of various **EL**-based multi-agent systems, such as the epistemic temporal approach proposed in [Fagin *et al.*, 1995; Parikh and Ramanujam, 1985] and the dynamic epistemic approach proposed in [Plaza, 1989; Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997; Baltag *et al.*, 1998].

On the other hand, there are other types of knowledge which are relevant to AI, such as *procedural knowledge* (*knowing how to do* a), and *descriptive knowledge* (*knowing*

what is d). Compared to the heated discussion between propositional knowledge and procedural knowledge in epistemology (cf. e.g., [Ryle, 1949; Carr, 1979; Stanley and Williamson, 2001]), the distinction between “knowing that” and “knowing what” received relatively little attention, although some early work in AI, such as [McCarthy, 1979], claimed that “knowing what” is the most useful notion among the three.

At the first glance, “knowing what” may seem to be reducible to “knowing that”, for example, instead of saying (1): “He knows [*what*] Peter’s phone number [is]”, we can also say (2): “He knows *that* Peter’s phone number is 1234” if we know Peter’s phone number. However, if we replace the “phone number” in (1) by “password” which is usually not known to us, then to express the exact meaning of the revised (1) in terms of knowing that, we may need to say the following:

(3): “He knows *that* Peter’s password is 0000 *or* he knows *that* Peter’s password is 0001 *or* ... *or* he knows *that* Peter’s password is 9999”

Clearly, in every day communication, we prefer the succinctness of sentence (1) compared to (3). Actually the scenario behind (3) is crucial in the setting of information security, where it is very common to assume that each agent has its private key while others have no idea what it is. We would like to express “I know that he knows his password, but I do not know it.” However, the literal translation in terms of propositional knowledge ($K_1K_2\phi \wedge \neg K_1\phi$) is clearly inconsistent in classic epistemic logic. Such concerns inspired different formalisms of knowledge in epistemic logic related to security verification (cf. e.g., [Ramanujam and Suresh, 2005; Halpern and Pucella, 2003; Dechesne and Wang, 2010]).

Independently from all the above-mentioned works, Plaza proposed a very natural knowing what operator K_v in the seminal work [Plaza, 1989], which is well-known for its contribution to *public announcement logic* (**PAL**) and the reduction-style axiomatization.¹ Intuitively, K_vd expresses exactly that “Agent i knows *what* d is (or i knows the *value* of d , in Plaza’s original term).” The K_v operator was used in [Plaza, 1989] to

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¹**PAL** was also independently proposed in [Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997; Gerbrandy, 1999].

handle the “sum-and-product” puzzle,² where it is crucial to distinguish the two kinds of knowledge and express *i* knows that *j* does not know what *d* is (formally, $K_i \neg K_{v_j} d$). With the corresponding semantics, formulas like $K_i K_{v_j} d \wedge \neg K_{v_i} d$ are perfectly consistent, in contrast to the inconsistency of $K_i K_j q \wedge \neg K_i q$ in the standard epistemic logic.

Plaza gave an axiomatization of **ELKv** (**EL** with the new K_v operator) and proposed a few axioms for **PALKv** (**PAL** with K_v). However, it is unknown whether these axioms are enough to axiomatize **PALKv** (cf. [Plaza, 1989] and [van Ditmarsch, 2007]).

In this paper, we will answer this open question and continue Plaza’s work on K_v in the context of public announcement logic. Our main technical contributions of this paper are summarized as below:

- The axioms proposed in [Plaza, 1989] do *not* axiomatize **PALKv** completely (Section 3);
- We introduce the *relativized* K_v operator which is a generalization of the original K_v operator (Section 4). We give a highly non-trivial complete axiomatization of the *single-agent* epistemic logic with this new operator (**ELKv^r**), based on which a complete axiomatization of single-agent **PAL** with this operator (**PALKv^r**) is provided (Section 5);
- **PALKv**, **PALKv^r** and **ELKv^r** are equally expressive but **ELKv** is strictly less expressive than them. Therefore it is impossible to reduce **PALKv** to **ELKv**, and we can simply use the more flexible **PALKv^r** instead of **PALKv** without increasing the expressive power (Section 6).

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Public Announcement Logic

Definition 1 (Logical Languages $\text{EL}(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{P})$ and $\text{PAL}(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{P})$). Given a set $\mathbf{P}$ of proposition letters and a set $\mathbf{I}$ of agent names, the language of public announcement logic $\text{PAL}(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{P})$ is defined as follows:

$$\phi ::= \top \mid p \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid K_i \phi \mid \langle \phi \rangle \phi$$

where $p \in \mathbf{P}$, $i \in \mathbf{I}$. The language of epistemic logic ($\text{EL}(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{P})$) is the announcement-free fragment of $\text{PAL}(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{P})$.

$K_i \phi$ is read “agent *i* knows that ϕ ”. $\langle \psi \rangle \phi$ says that “ ψ can be truthfully announced publicly, and after its announcement ϕ holds.” As usual, we define $\perp$, $\phi \vee \psi$, $\phi \rightarrow \psi$, $\bar{K}_i \phi$ and $[\psi] \phi$ as the abbreviations of $\neg \top$, $\neg(\neg \phi \wedge \neg \psi)$, $\neg \phi \vee \psi$, $\neg K_i \neg \phi$ and $\neg \langle \psi \rangle \neg \phi$ respectively.

In the sequel, we fix $\mathbf{I}$ and $\mathbf{P}$ thus simply writing **PAL** and **EL** for $\text{PAL}(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{P})$ and $\text{EL}(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{P})$ respectively.

The semantics of **PAL** is defined on (S5) Kripke structures. An *epistemic model* for **PAL** is a triple $\mathcal{M} = \langle S, \{\sim_i \mid i \in \mathbf{I}\}, V \rangle$ where S is a non-empty set of possible worlds, $\sim_i$ is an equivalence relation over S , and V is a valuation function assigning a set of worlds $V(p) \subseteq S$ to each $p \in \mathbf{P}$. Given an epistemic model $\mathcal{M}$, the semantics is defined as follows:

²See [van Ditmarsch *et al.*, 2008] for the history of the puzzle and discussions in **PAL** without the K_v operator.

$\mathcal{M}, s \models \top$	$\Leftrightarrow$	always
$\mathcal{M}, s \models p$	$\Leftrightarrow$	$s \in V(p)$
$\mathcal{M}, s \models \neg \phi$	$\Leftrightarrow$	$\mathcal{M}, s \not\models \phi$
$\mathcal{M}, s \models \phi \wedge \psi$	$\Leftrightarrow$	$\mathcal{M}, s \models \phi$ and $\mathcal{M}, s \models \psi$
$\mathcal{M}, s \models K_i \psi$	$\Leftrightarrow$	for all t such that $s \sim_i t : \mathcal{M}, t \models \psi$
$\mathcal{M}, s \models \langle \psi \rangle \phi$	$\Leftrightarrow$	$\mathcal{M}, s \models \psi$ and $\mathcal{M} _\psi, s \models \phi$

where $\mathcal{M}|_\psi = (S', \{\sim'_i \mid i \in \mathbf{I}\}, V')$ such that:

$$S' = \{s \mid \mathcal{M}, s \models \psi\}, \sim'_i = \sim_i \upharpoonright_{S' \times S'}, \text{ and } V'(p) = V(p) \cap S'.$$

An announcement $\langle \psi \rangle$ is interpreted as a *model transformer* which deletes the worlds that do not satisfy ψ .

It is shown in [Plaza, 1989] via a reduction to **EL** that the following axiomatization is sound and complete (cf. also [van Ditmarsch *et al.*, 2007] for details):

System **PAL**

Axiom Schemas

TAUT all the instances of tautologies

T $K_i \phi \rightarrow \phi$

4 $K_i \phi \rightarrow K_i K_i \phi$

5 $\neg K_i \phi \rightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$

!ATOM $\langle \psi \rangle p \leftrightarrow (\psi \wedge p)$

!NEG $\langle \psi \rangle \neg \phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \wedge \neg \langle \psi \rangle \phi)$

!CON $\langle \psi \rangle (\phi \wedge \chi) \leftrightarrow (\langle \psi \rangle \phi \wedge \langle \psi \rangle \chi)$

!K $\langle \psi \rangle K_i \phi \leftrightarrow (\psi \wedge K_i (\psi \rightarrow \langle \psi \rangle \phi))$

Rules

MP $\frac{\phi, \phi \rightarrow \psi}{\psi}$

NECK $\frac{\frac{\psi}{\phi}}{K_i \phi}$

RE $\frac{\psi \leftrightarrow \chi}{\phi \leftrightarrow \phi[\psi/\chi]}$

where $p \in \mathbf{P} \cup \{\top\}$.

Note that in [Plaza, 1989] Plaza did not make it clear whether the RE rule (*replacement of equivalences*) allows the substitutions of the formulas inside the announcements. Here we suppose so.³

It can be shown that the following schemata are derivable/admissible in **PAL**.⁴

Axiom Schema	Rule
DIST! $[\chi](\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ([\chi]\phi \rightarrow [\chi]\psi)$	NEC! $\frac{\phi}{[\chi]\phi}$

DIST! and NEC! will appear in our later discussions. In the sequel, we use $\mathbb{EL}$ to denote **PAL** without the so-called “reduction axioms” (i.e., !ATOM, !NEG, !CON, and !K). It is well-known that $\mathbb{EL}$ completely axiomatizes **EL**.

2.2 Adding the K_v operator

Given $\mathbf{I}$, $\mathbf{P}$ and a set $\mathbf{D}$ of names, the language **PALKv**($\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{D}$) (**PALKv** for short) is defined as:

$$\phi ::= \top \mid p \mid K_{v_i} d \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid K_i \phi \mid \langle \phi \rangle \phi$$

where $p \in \mathbf{P}$, $i \in \mathbf{I}$, and $d \in \mathbf{D}$. As before, we obtain an epistemic language **ELKv**($\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{D}$) (**ELKv** for short) when we ignore the announcements in **PALKv**.

³This makes our incompleteness result stronger.

⁴For a thorough discussion on axiomatizations of **PAL**, see [Wang and Cao, 2013].

To interpret the new $Kv_i d$ formulas, we need the assignment function $V_D : D \times S \rightarrow O$ in the epistemic models, where O is a non-empty set of *objects*. The semantics of $Kv_i d$ is as follows:

$$\mathcal{M}, s \models Kv_i d \iff \text{for any } t_1, t_2 : \text{if } s \sim_i t_1, s \sim_i t_2, \text{ then } V_D(d, t_1) = V_D(d, t_2).$$

Kv acts as a mixture of a modality and a predicate. It is not hard to see that Kv_i also obeys the positive and negative introspections, namely the following two axioms are valid:

$$\begin{aligned} K\vee 4 \quad & Kv_i d \rightarrow K_i Kv_i d \\ K\vee 5 \quad & \neg Kv_i d \rightarrow K_i \neg Kv_i d \end{aligned}$$

It is claimed (without a proof) in [Plaza, 1989] that adding $K\vee 4$ and $K\vee 5$ to $\mathbb{EL}$ completely axiomatizes **ELKv**.

Now a natural question is: how can we axiomatize **PALKv**? [Plaza, 1989] proposed the following extra axioms on top of **PAL** with $K\vee 4$, $K\vee 5$:

$$\begin{aligned} KKv \quad & \langle K_i \phi \rangle Kv_i d \leftrightarrow K_i \phi \wedge Kv_i d \\ K\vee Kv \quad & \langle Kv_i c \rangle Kv_i d \leftrightarrow Kv_i c \wedge Kv_i d \\ !Kv \quad & \langle \phi \rangle Kv_i d \rightarrow K_i (\phi \rightarrow \langle \phi \rangle Kv_i d) \\ !nKv \quad & \langle \phi \rangle \neg Kv_i d \rightarrow K_i (\phi \rightarrow \langle \phi \rangle \neg Kv_i d) \end{aligned}$$

It is not known whether the above axiom schemata are enough to completely axiomatize **PALKv**.⁵

In fact, the last three axioms above are superfluous. In the sequel, let us denote $\mathbb{PAL} + K\vee 4 + K\vee 5 + KKv$ as **PALKV_p**. It is not hard to see that $K\vee Kv$, $!Kv$, $!nKv$ can all be derived in **PALKV_p** by using $K\vee 4$, $K\vee 5$, T , KKv , $!K$ and RE :

Proposition 2. (1) $\vdash_{\mathbb{PALKV}_p} \langle Kv_i c \rangle Kv_i d \leftrightarrow (Kv_i c \wedge Kv_i d)$;
(2) $\vdash_{\mathbb{PALKV}_p} \langle \phi \rangle Kv_i d \rightarrow K_i (\phi \rightarrow \langle \phi \rangle Kv_i d)$;
(3) $\vdash_{\mathbb{PALKV}_p} \langle \phi \rangle \neg Kv_i d \rightarrow K_i (\phi \rightarrow \langle \phi \rangle \neg Kv_i d)$.

Proof. For (1):

$$\begin{aligned} (i) \quad & Kv_i c \leftrightarrow K_i Kv_i c && K\vee 4, T \\ (ii) \quad & \langle Kv_i c \rangle Kv_i d \leftrightarrow \langle K_i Kv_i c \rangle Kv_i d && RE \\ (iii) \quad & \langle K_i Kv_i c \rangle Kv_i d \leftrightarrow K_i Kv_i c \wedge Kv_i d && KKv \\ (iv) \quad & \langle Kv_i c \rangle Kv_i d \leftrightarrow (Kv_i c \wedge Kv_i d) && MP(ii)(iii) \end{aligned}$$

For (2):

$$\begin{aligned} (i) \quad & Kv_i d \rightarrow K_i Kv_i d && K\vee 4 \\ (ii) \quad & \langle \phi \rangle Kv_i d \rightarrow \langle \phi \rangle K_i Kv_i d && DIST!, NEC! \\ (iii) \quad & \langle \phi \rangle K_i Kv_i d \leftrightarrow (\phi \wedge K_i (\phi \rightarrow \langle \phi \rangle Kv_i d)) && !K \\ (iv) \quad & \langle \phi \rangle Kv_i d \rightarrow K_i (\phi \rightarrow \langle \phi \rangle Kv_i d) && MP(ii)(iii) \end{aligned}$$

The proof of (3) is similar as (2). $\square$

In the later discussion we will focus on **PALKV_p**.

3 Incompleteness of **PALKV_p**

To prove the incompleteness of **PALKV_p**, we will show that the following valid formula is not derivable in **PALKV_p**:

$$\theta : \langle p \rangle Kv_i d \wedge \langle q \rangle Kv_i d \rightarrow \langle p \vee q \rangle Kv_i d$$

⁵Note that there is no obvious reduction axiom for $Kv_i d$ and we will show it is *impossible* to reduce **PALKv** to **ELKv** in Section 6.

In order to show this, we design a semantics $\Vdash$ on a class $\mathbb{C}$ of special models such that all the axiom schemata and rules of **PALKV_p** are valid w.r.t. $\Vdash$ on $\mathbb{C}$ but not θ . Namely we have for all **PALKv** formulas $\phi : \vdash_{\mathbb{PALKV}_p} \phi \implies \mathbb{C} \Vdash \phi$ and $\mathbb{C} \not\Vdash \theta$, thus we have $\not\vdash_{\mathbb{PALKV}_p} \theta$.

Inspired by the semantics developed in [Wang and Cao, 2013], we treat the announcement operator $\langle \phi \rangle$ as a standard modality interpreted on models with ϕ transitions.

Definition 3. (Extended model) An extended (epistemic) model for **PALKv** is a tuple $\langle S, \{\sim_i \mid i \in I\}, \{\xrightarrow{\phi} \mid \phi \in \mathbb{PALKv}\}, V, V_D \rangle$ where

- $\langle S, \{\sim_i \mid i \in I\}, V, V_D \rangle$ is a standard epistemic model for **PALKv**.
- For each **PALKv** formula ϕ , $\xrightarrow{\phi}$ is a binary relation over S .

We now define the truth conditions of **PALKv** formulas on extended models (w.r.t. $\Vdash$) as follows (we only show the clause which differs from $\models$):

$$\mathcal{M}, s \Vdash \langle \phi \rangle \psi \iff \text{for some } t, s \xrightarrow{\phi} t \text{ and } t \Vdash \psi$$

Compared with the standard semantics w.r.t. $\models$, the only change is the interpretation of $\langle \phi \rangle \psi$. It is clear that

Proposition 4. $\Vdash$ coincides with $\models$ on **ELKv** formulas.

Now we try to define a class of extended models where these two semantics get even closer on **PALKv** formulas.

Definition 5. (Normal extended epistemic model) An extended model $\mathcal{M} = \langle S, \{\sim_i \mid i \in I\}, \{\xrightarrow{\phi} \mid \phi \in \mathbb{PALKv}\}, V, V_D \rangle$ is called normal if the following properties hold for any $s, t \in S$, any $d \in D$ and $\phi \in \mathbb{PALKv}$:

- P-INV** If $s \xrightarrow{\phi} t$, then for all $p \in P$: $s \in V(p) \iff t \in V(p)$.
- PFUNC** If $\mathcal{M}, s \Vdash \phi$ then s has a unique ϕ -successor. If $\mathcal{M}, s \not\Vdash \phi$ then s has no ϕ -successor.
- NM** If $s \sim_i s'$, $s \xrightarrow{\phi} t$ and $s' \xrightarrow{\phi} t'$, then $t \sim_i t'$.
- PR** If $t \sim_i t'$ and $s \xrightarrow{\phi} t$, then there exists an s' such that $s \sim_i s'$ and $s' \xrightarrow{\phi} t'$.
- D-INV** If $s \xrightarrow{K_i \phi} t$, then $V_D(d, s) = V_D(d, t)$.
- U-RE** If $\mathcal{M} \Vdash \phi \leftrightarrow \psi$ then $s \xrightarrow{\phi} t \iff s \xrightarrow{\psi} t$.


Note that **PFUNC** and **U-RE** refer to $\Vdash$. Let $\mathbb{C}$ be the class of all the normal extended models. We can show that **PFUNC** guarantees the validity of $!NEG$ and $!CON$ on $\mathbb{C}$. Under the presence of **PFUNC**, the validities of $!ATOM$ and $!K$ are guaranteed by **P-INV** and the combination of **NM** (*no miracles*) and **PR** (*perfect recall*) respectively (cf. [Wang and Cao, 2013] for a similar proof in the standard **PAL**). Moreover, **U-RE** helps to make sure that **RE** is valid, and **D-INV** is used to show, under the presence of **PR** and **NM**, the validity of **KKv**. Based on these observations (proofs are omitted due to space limitation), we can prove the following:

Lemma 6. PALKV_p is sound w.r.t $\models$ on $\mathbb{C}$.

However, the $\models$ -valid formulas θ is not $\models$ -valid on $\mathbb{C}$.

Lemma 7. $\mathbb{C} \not\models \langle p \rangle K v_i d \wedge \langle q \rangle K v_i d \rightarrow \langle p \vee q \rangle K v_i d$.

Proof. For simplicity we assume $\mathbf{I} = \{1\}$, $\mathbf{P} = \{p, q\}$ and $\mathbf{D} = \{d\}$. Consider the following model $\mathcal{M}$ (we omit the reflexive epistemic links and only show the necessary parts for evaluating the desired formula, with $\bullet$ and $\circ$ denoting the objects assigned to d):



Note that for any ϕ : $\mathcal{M} \not\models (p \vee q) \leftrightarrow K_1 \phi$, since $K_1 \phi$ will have a uniform truth value on t, s, s' while $p \vee q$ is false only on the leftmost world. Similarly, for any ϕ : $\mathcal{M} \not\models p \leftrightarrow K_1 \phi$ and $\mathcal{M} \not\models q \leftrightarrow K_1 \phi$. Thus although U-RE and D-INV hold in $\mathcal{M}$, the assignments of d at s and s' can be different from the assignments at the bottom four worlds. It is not hard to see that (a proper completion of) $\mathcal{M}$ is a normal extended model and

$$\mathcal{M}, s \models \langle p \rangle K v_i d \wedge \langle q \rangle K v_i d \wedge \neg \langle p \vee q \rangle K v_i d.$$

Therefore θ is not valid in $\mathbb{C}$. $\square$

From Lemmata 6 and 7 we have:

Theorem 8. $\langle p \rangle K v_i d \wedge \langle q \rangle K v_i d \rightarrow \langle p \vee q \rangle K v_i d$ is not derivable in PALKV_p , thus PALKV_p is not complete w.r.t. $\models$ on epistemic models.

4 PAL with the relativized Kv operator

To prevent the counter example in the previous section, we need an axiom to guarantee that the assignments of the names in $\mathbf{D}$ will essentially stay the same after any announcements. A similar issue applies to the basic propositions but we can use $!ATOM$ to guarantee the propositional invariance. In contrast, we cannot directly talk about the assignments in PALKV .

In this section, instead of trying to give an axiomatization of PALKV , we will discuss the language PALKV^r where Kv is replaced by a more general operator, which can be viewed as a relativized version of Kv . The idea of relativizing a modal operator also appeared in [van Benthem *et al.*, 2006] where the authors gave an axiomatization of PALC^r which is PAL extended with a relativised version of the common knowledge operator.

Formally, the language of PALKV^r is defined as follows:

$$\phi ::= \top \mid p \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid K_i \phi \mid K v_i(\phi, d) \mid \langle \phi \rangle \phi$$

where $p \in \mathbf{P}, i \in \mathbf{I}, d \in \mathbf{D}$.

$K v_i(\phi, d)$ says that the agent i would know what d is if he were informed that ϕ is true. It is different from $\phi \rightarrow K v_i d$, $K_i \phi \rightarrow K v_i d$, and $K_i(\phi \rightarrow K v_i d)$. The distinction will become clear after understanding the following semantics w.r.t.

$$\mathcal{M} = \langle S, \{\sim_i \mid i \in \mathbf{I}\}, V, V_{\mathbf{D}} \rangle:$$

$\mathcal{M}, s \models K v_i(\phi, d) \iff$	for every $t_1, t_2 \in S$ such that $s \sim_i t_1$ and $s \sim_i t_2$: if $\mathcal{M}, t_1 \models \phi$ and $\mathcal{M}, t_2 \models \phi$ then $V_{\mathbf{D}}(d, t_1) = V_{\mathbf{D}}(d, t_2)$
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Now the original $K v_i$ operator can be viewed as $K v_i(\top, \cdot)$. Therefore PALKV^r is indeed an extension of PALKV . As before, we denote the announcement-free part of PALKV^r as ELKV^r .

We can see there is a similarity between an announcement and a condition in the relativized Kv operator, demonstrated by the following validity:

$$!K v^r : \quad \langle \phi \rangle K v_i(\psi, d) \leftrightarrow (\phi \wedge K v_i(\langle \phi \rangle \psi, d))$$

Note that $!K v^r$ is also in the shape of the reduction axioms which push the announcement to the “inner” part of the formulas. Based on this observation, we can show, as what Plaza showed for PAL and EL , that PALKV^r and ELKV^r are equally expressive.

Theorem 9. PALKV^r is equally expressive as ELKV^r .

Proof. Since PALKV^r is an extension of ELKV^r thus PALKV^r is no less expressive than ELKV^r . We show that PALKV^r is no more expressive than ELKV^r by giving the following truth preserving translation $t : \text{PALKV}^r \rightarrow \text{ELKV}^r$ (we only show the non-trivial cases due to space limitation):

$$\begin{aligned} t(K v_i(\phi, d)) &= K v_i(t(\phi), d) \\ t(\langle \phi \rangle \top) &= t(\phi) \\ t(\langle \phi \rangle p) &= t(\phi \wedge p) \\ t(\langle \phi \rangle \neg\psi) &= t(\phi \wedge \neg\langle \phi \rangle \psi) \\ t(\langle \phi \rangle (\psi \wedge \chi)) &= t(\langle \phi \rangle \psi \wedge \langle \phi \rangle \chi) \\ t(\langle \phi \rangle K_i \psi) &= t(\phi \wedge K_i(\phi \rightarrow \langle \phi \rangle \psi)) \\ t(\langle \phi \rangle K v_i(\psi, d)) &= t(\phi \wedge K v_i(\langle \phi \rangle \psi, d)) \end{aligned}$$

By defining a suitable complexity measure of PALKV^r formulas as in the case for PAL (cf. [van Ditmarsch *et al.*, 2007]), we can show the translation can eventually eliminate the announcement operators. We can also prove $\phi \equiv t(\phi)$ for every $\phi \in \text{PALKV}^r$ by induction on the structure of ϕ . $\square$

Now, as in the case of PAL , if we have a complete axiomatization of ELKV^r , then we can also axiomatize PALKV^r by using the reduction axioms:

Theorem 10. If ELKV^r is completely axiomatized by $\mathbb{S}$ then $\mathbb{S}$ plus RE , $!ATOM$, $!CON$, $!NEG$, $!K$, and $!K v^r$ completely axiomatizes PALKV^r .

Note that we need to include the rule RE to facilitate the completeness proof via reductions (cf. [Wang and Cao, 2013] for detailed discussions in the context of PAL). In the next section we will axiomatize ELKV^r in the single agent case.

5 Axiomatization of ELKV^r_1

As the reader may expect, axiomatizing ELKV^r is much harder than the case of ELKV due to the condition in the relativized operator. In the rest of this section, we will provide a

complete axiomatization of $\mathbf{ELKv}^r$ for the *single agent* case (call it $\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r$). Although all the new axioms that we propose also hold in the multi-agent case, there are still some difficulties in the completeness proof related to multiple agents, to which we will come back at the end of the paper.

5.1 System $\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r$

Based on single-agent $\mathbf{EL}$, we propose the following extra axiom schemata and name the resulting system $\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r$:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{DISTKv}^r & K(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (Kv(\psi, d) \rightarrow Kv(\phi, d)) \\ \text{Kv}^r 4 & Kv(\phi, d) \rightarrow KKv(\phi, d) \\ \text{Kv}^r \perp & Kv(\perp, d) \\ \text{Kv}^r \vee & \hat{K}(\phi \wedge \psi) \wedge Kv(\phi, d) \wedge Kv(\psi, d) \rightarrow Kv(\phi \vee \psi, d) \end{array}$$

DISTKv^r is the distribution axiom for the relativised Kv operator (pay attention to the positions of ψ and ϕ in the consequent). $\text{Kv}^r 4$ is a variation of the positive introspection axiom. $\text{Kv}^r \perp$ stipulates the precondition of the Kv operator. Maybe the most interesting axiom is $\text{Kv}^r \vee$ which will play a very important role in the later completeness proof. Intuitively, it handles the composition of the conditions in the relativized operator: suppose all the possible ϕ worlds agree on what d is and all the possible ψ worlds also agree on d , then the overlap between ϕ possibilities and ψ possibilities implies that all the $\phi \vee \psi$ possibilities also agree on what d is.

It is not hard to see that the extra axioms are all valid:

Theorem 11. $\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r$ is sound with respect to the class of epistemic models with assignments.

In the sequel, for readability, we will sometimes write $\vdash$ for $\vdash_{\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r}$.

Seeing $\text{Kv}^r 4$, the reader may miss a version of negative introspection $\neg Kv(\phi, d) \rightarrow K\neg Kv(\phi, d)$. Actually it can be derived in $\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r$:

Proposition 12. $\vdash_{\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r} \neg Kv(\phi, d) \rightarrow K\neg Kv(\phi, d)$

Proof.

$$\begin{array}{ll} KKv(\phi, d) \leftrightarrow Kv(\phi, d) & \text{T, Kv}^r 4 \\ \neg KKv(\phi, d) \rightarrow K\neg KKv(\phi, d) & 5 \\ \neg Kv(\phi, d) \rightarrow K\neg Kv(\phi, d) & \text{RE} \end{array}$$

□

$\text{Kv}^r \vee$ can be generalized to arbitrary finite disjunctions due to an easy induction proof based on $\text{Kv}^r \vee$.

Proposition 13. For any finite set of $\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r$ formulas U :

$$\vdash_{\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r} \hat{K}(\bigwedge U) \wedge \bigwedge_{\phi \in U} Kv(\phi, d) \rightarrow Kv(\bigvee U, d).$$

5.2 Completeness of $\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r$

In this subsection we prove that $\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r$ is complete w.r.t. the class of epistemic models. As in normal modal logics, we will show that every consistent set of $\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r$ formulas is satisfiable at some state in a canonical model. In defining the canonical model we need to borrow some ideas from the Henkin construction in first-order logic. The difficulties lie in the definition of the canonical model and the proof of the truth lemma for the new Kv operator, as we will explain later.

Canonical model

The canonical model $\mathcal{M}^c$ of $\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r$ is $\langle S^c, \sim^c, V^c, V_D^c \rangle$ where:

- $S^c = MCS \times \{0, 1\}$, where MCS is the set of $\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r$ -maximal consistent sets. That is, every maximal consistent set has two copies in S^c . We write $\phi \in s$ if ϕ is in the maximal consistent set of s . We write $\phi \in s \cap t$ if $\phi \in s$ and $\phi \in t$.
- $s \sim^c t$ iff $\{\phi \mid K\phi \in s\} \subseteq t$.
- $V^c(p) = \{s \in S^c \mid p \in s\}$.
- $V_D^c(d, s) = |(d, s)|_R$. That is, $V_D^c(d, s)$ is the equivalence class under the equivalence relation R defined below over $\{(d, s) \mid s \in S^c, d \in \mathbf{D}\}$:

$$R = \{((d, s), (e, t)) \mid d = e, s \sim^c t \text{ and } Kv(\phi, d) \in s \text{ for some } \phi \in s \cap t\} \cup \{((d, s), (d, s)) \mid d \in \mathbf{D}, s \in S^c\}$$

To show the above definition is well-defined, we need some simple propositions. The first is a standard exercise for $\mathbf{EL}$:

Proposition 14. $s \sim^c t$ iff $\{\phi \mid K\phi \in s\} = \{\phi \mid K\phi \in t\}$, thus $\sim^c$ is an equivalence relation.

Based on Proposition 14 and $\text{Kv}^r 4$, the following is immediate:

Proposition 15. For any $s, t \in S^c$, if $s \sim^c t$, then $Kv(\phi, d) \in s$ iff $Kv(\phi, d) \in t$.

Based on the above two propositions and the definition of R , R is clearly reflexive and symmetric. The transitivity can be shown by using the axiom $\text{Kv}^r \vee$, and then we have:

Proposition 16. R is an equivalence relation on $\{(d, s) \mid s \in S^c, d \in \mathbf{D}\}$.

Remark 17. The readers may wonder why we used two copies of each maximal consistent set. Consider the following model:

$$p, d \mapsto \circ \text{ --- } p, d \mapsto \bullet$$

It is not hard to see that both worlds satisfy exactly the same $\mathbf{PALKv}^r$ formulas. However, we do need these two worlds to differentiate the assignments of the name d . These two copies of each maximal consistent set will play an important role in our proof of the completeness.

Completeness

In order to establish the truth lemma, we need to show that if $Kv(\phi, d) \notin s$ then $\mathcal{M}^c, s \models \neg Kv(\phi, d)$. This is the most difficult part in the completeness proof which requires a few results below.

Given a state $s \in S^c$ such that $Kv(\phi, d) \notin s$, let $Z = \{\psi \mid K\psi \in s\} \cup \{\phi\}$ and $X = \{\neg\chi \mid Kv(\chi, d) \in s\}$. We have the following observations.

- Observation 18.**
1. For any $\neg\chi \in X$, $\{\neg\chi\} \cup Z$ is consistent.
 2. Z is consistent and every element in X is also consistent.

Proof. In the sequel, we will write $\vdash$ as the shorthand for $\vdash_{\mathbf{ELKv}_1^r}$.

For (1): Suppose not, then there exist $\psi_1, \dots, \psi_m$ such that $\vdash \psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_m \wedge \phi \rightarrow \chi$, equivalently, $\vdash \psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_m \rightarrow \chi$

$(\phi \rightarrow \chi)$, and thus $\vdash K\psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge K\psi_m \rightarrow K(\phi \rightarrow \chi)$ by DISTK and NECK. Since $K\psi_1, \dots, K\psi_m \in s$, $K(\phi \rightarrow \chi) \in s$. Now by DISTKV^r and the fact that $Kv(\chi, d) \in s$, it follows that $Kv(\phi, d) \in s$, contradiction.

For (2): followed immediately from (1) based on the non-emptiness of X due to $Kv^r \perp$. $\square$

Recall that we want to show that $Kv(\phi, d) \notin s$ implies $\mathcal{M}^c, s \models \neg Kv(\phi, d)$. To show that $Kv(\phi, d)$ does not hold on s , we need to construct two ϕ worlds which are linked with s but with different assignments for d . In order to do this, according to the definition of R , we have to make sure that these two worlds do not share any ψ such that $Kv(\psi, d) \in s$.

Now since $\mathbf{ELKV}_1^r$ is denumerable, we can enumerate all formulas in X as $\neg\chi_0, \neg\chi_1, \dots$. Then we start to add these χ_i one by one to two copies of Z . The procedure is described as follows:

1. Let $B_0 = Z \cup \{\neg\chi_0\}$ and let $C_0 = Z$.
2. If B_k and C_k are defined then we take $\neg\chi_{k+1} \in X$, and try to add it into B or C as follows: if it is consistent with B_k then let $B_{k+1} = B_k \cup \{\neg\chi_{k+1}\}$ and let $C_{k+1} = C_k$; otherwise let $B_{k+1} = B_k$ and let $C_{k+1} = C_k \cup \{\neg\chi_{k+1}\}$.
3. Let $B = \bigcup_{k < \omega} B_k$ and $C = \bigcup_{k < \omega} C_k$.

To construct two worlds out of B and C , we need to show B and C are consistent. From Observation 18, B_0 and C_0 are consistent. We only need to show that the second step preserves consistency, which amounts to the following lemma:

Lemma 19. *Suppose $Kv(\phi, d) \notin s$. For any k , if B_k and C_k are consistent, then $B_k \cup \{\neg\chi_{k+1}\}$ is inconsistent implies $C_k \cup \{\neg\chi_{k+1}\}$ is consistent.*

Proof. Suppose not, then there is a k such that both $B_k \cup \{\neg\chi_{k+1}\}$ and $C_k \cup \{\neg\chi_{k+1}\}$ are inconsistent. Now let $\bar{U} = B_k \setminus Z$, $\bar{V} = C_k \setminus Z$, $U = \{\chi \mid \neg\chi \in \bar{U}\}$, and $V = \{\chi \mid \neg\chi \in \bar{V}\}$. Note that $U, V, \bar{U}, \bar{V}$ are all finite.

We claim: there exist $\psi_1, \dots, \psi_l, \psi'_1, \dots, \psi'_m, \psi''_1, \dots, \psi''_n \in \{\psi \mid Kv(\psi, d) \in s\}$ such that

- (i) $\vdash \psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_l \wedge \phi \wedge \bigwedge \bar{U} \rightarrow \chi_{k+1}$,
- (ii) $\vdash \psi'_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi'_m \wedge \phi \wedge \bigwedge \bar{V} \rightarrow \chi_{k+1}$,
- (iii) $\vdash \psi''_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi''_n \wedge \phi \wedge \bigwedge \bar{U} \rightarrow \bigwedge V$.

(i) and (ii) are immediate from the inconsistency of $B_k \cup \{\neg\chi_{k+1}\}$ and $C_k \cup \{\neg\chi_{k+1}\}$. For (iii), first note that for any $\chi \in V$, $\{\neg\chi\} \cup B_k$ is inconsistent due to the construction of B_k . Therefore for each $\chi \in V$ there exist $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_h \in \{\psi \mid Kv(\psi, d) \in s\}$ such that:

$$\vdash (\theta_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \theta_h \wedge \phi \wedge \bigwedge \bar{U}) \rightarrow \chi$$

Now since V is a finite set, we collect all such θ for each $\chi \in V$ to obtain (iii).

From (i) – (iii), NECK, DISTK and the fact that

$$K\psi_1, \dots, K\psi_l, K\psi'_1, \dots, K\psi'_m, K\psi''_1, \dots, K\psi''_n \in s,$$

we can show the following:

- (iv) $K((\phi \wedge \bigwedge \bar{U}) \rightarrow \chi_{k+1}) \in s$,
- (v) $K((\phi \wedge \bigwedge \bar{V}) \rightarrow \chi_{k+1}) \in s$,
- (vi) $K((\phi \wedge \bigwedge \bar{U}) \rightarrow \bigwedge V) \in s$.

In the following, we will show that $\hat{K}(\chi_{k+1} \wedge \bigwedge V) \in s$. First we claim $\hat{K}(\phi \wedge \bigwedge \bar{U}) \in s$. Suppose not, then $K\neg(\phi \wedge \bigwedge \bar{U}) \in s$, thus $\neg(\phi \wedge \bigwedge \bar{U}) \in B_k$. Due to the construction of B_k we know ϕ and $\bar{U}$ are in B_k , thus B_k is inconsistent, contradicting the assumption. Therefore $\hat{K}(\phi \wedge \bigwedge \bar{U}) \in s$ thus by (iv), (vi) we have $\hat{K}(\chi_{k+1} \wedge \bigwedge V) \in s$.

By our assumption, for any $\chi \in V \cup \{\chi_{k+1}\}$ we have $Kv(\chi, d) \in s$. Now based on this fact and $\hat{K}(\chi_{k+1} \wedge \bigwedge V) \in s$, we can use Proposition 13, and obtain the following:

$$(vii) \quad Kv(\chi_{k+1} \vee \bigvee V, d) \in s.$$

Now let us change the from of (v) to the following:

$$(v') \quad K(\phi \rightarrow (\bigvee V \vee \chi_{k+1})) \in s,$$

Based on (v'), (vii) and DISTKV^r, we have $Kv(\phi, d) \in s$, contradiction.

In sum, one of $B_k \cup \{\neg\chi_{k+1}\}$ and $C_k \cup \{\neg\chi_{k+1}\}$ is consistent. $\square$

Based on Lemma 19, using Lindenbaum-like argument, we have the following:

Lemma 20. *There are X_0, X_1 such that $X_0 \cap X_1 = \emptyset$, $X_0 \cup X_1 = X$, and both $B = Z \cup X_0$ and $C = Z \cup X_1$ are consistent. Therefore B and C can be extended into two maximal consistent sets.*

Note that the above lemma does not rule out the possibility that the two maximal consistent sets being the same. We will handle this by using different copies in the canonical model.

Now we will prove the completeness of $\mathbf{ELKV}_1^r$, i.e., every valid $\mathbf{ELKV}_1^r$ formula is $\mathbf{ELKV}_1^r$ -provable. As usual, we construct the canonical model which can satisfy each consistent set of $\mathbf{ELKV}_1^r$ formulas.

Lemma 21 (Truth Lemma). *For any $\mathbf{ELKV}_1^r$ formula ϕ , $\phi \in s$ iff $\mathcal{M}^c, s \models \phi$.*

Proof. By induction on ϕ . We will only show the case of $Kv(\phi, d)$ in detail since other cases are standard exercises as in normal modal logic. The direction from $Kv(\phi, d) \in s$ to $\mathcal{M}^c, s \models Kv(\phi, d)$ is straightforward based on the induction hypothesis and our definition of R .

Now for the converse, suppose that $Kv(\phi, d) \notin s$, we need to show $\mathcal{M}^c, s \not\models Kv(\phi, d)$. Recall that $Z = \{\psi \mid Kv(\psi, d) \in s\} \cup \{\phi\}$ and $X = \{\neg\chi \mid Kv(\chi, d) \in s\}$. Lemma 20 guarantees that we can find two (possibly identical) maximal consistent sets B' and C' such that $Z \cup X_0 \subseteq B'$ and $Z \cup X_1 \subseteq C'$ for some X_0, X_1 satisfying $X = X_0 \cup X_1$.

Now we can construct two different worlds $t_0 = (B', 0)$ and $t_1 = (C', 1)$. It is clear that $t_0, t_1 \in S^c$. Since $Z \subseteq t_0 \cap t_1$ we have $t_0 \sim^c s \sim^c t_1$, and $\mathcal{M}^c, t_0 \models \phi$ and $\mathcal{M}^c, t_1 \models \phi$ due to the induction hypothesis. Now we claim $((d, t_0), (d, t_1)) \notin R$. To see this, consider any $Kv(\chi, d) \in s$ (equivalently, any $\neg\chi \in X$), we have either $\chi \notin B'$ or $\chi \notin C'$ since $X_0 \cup X_1 = X$ and B', C' are consistent. $\square$

Based on the above lemma it is routine to show:

Theorem 22. $\mathbf{ELKV}_1^r$ is sound and complete.

Based on this theorem and Theorem 10, $\mathbf{ELKV}_1^r + !\text{ATOM} + !\text{NEG} + !\text{CON} + !\text{K} + !\text{KV}^r$ is sound and complete for $\mathbf{PALKV}_1^r$.

6 Expressivity

In this section we compare the expressivity of the various logical languages that we discussed in this paper. The results are summarized in the following (transitive) diagram:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \mathbf{ELKv}^r & \longleftrightarrow & \mathbf{PALKv}^r \\ \uparrow & & \downarrow \\ \mathbf{ELKv} & \longrightarrow & \mathbf{PALKv} \end{array}$$

Note that, in contrast to the axiomatization result, in this section all the results also hold in multi-agent cases.

Theorem 9 already shows that $\mathbf{ELKv}^r$ and $\mathbf{PALKv}^r$ are equally expressive. In the sequel, to complete the diagram, we first show that $\mathbf{ELKv}$ is strictly less expressive than $\mathbf{PALKv}$ then prove that $\mathbf{ELKv}^r$ is equally expressive as $\mathbf{PALKv}$. To compare $\mathbf{ELKv}$ and $\mathbf{PALKv}$, we give two models that cannot be distinguished by any $\mathbf{ELKv}$ formula but can be distinguished by a $\mathbf{PALKv}$ formula. First we need a notion of bisimulation for $\mathbf{ELKv}$ models.

Definition 23. Let $\mathcal{M}_1 = \langle S_1, \{\sim_i^1 \mid i \in \mathbf{I}\}, V_1, V_D^1 \rangle$ and $\mathcal{M}_2 = \langle S_2, \{\sim_i^2 \mid i \in \mathbf{I}\}, V_2, V_D^2 \rangle$ be two models. A d -bisimulation between $\mathcal{M}_1$ and $\mathcal{M}_2$ is a non-empty relation $\mathcal{R} \subseteq S_1 \times S_2$ such that if $s_1 \mathcal{R} s_2$ then the following requirements hold for all $i \in \mathbf{I}$:

- Inv:* $V_1(s_1) = V_2(s_2)$;
- Zig:* if $s_1 \sim_i^1 t_1$, then there exists $t_2 \in S_2$ such that $s_2 \sim_i^2 t_2$ and $t_1 \mathcal{R} t_2$;
- Zag:* if $s_2 \sim_i^2 t_2$, then there exists $t_1 \in S_1$ such that $s_1 \sim_i^1 t_1$ and $t_1 \mathcal{R} t_2$;
- Kv-Zig:* if $t_1 \sim_i^1 s_1 \sim_i^1 t'_1$, and $V_D^1(d, t_1) \neq V_D^1(d, t'_1)$ for some d then there exist $t_2, t'_2 \in S_2$ such that $t_2 \sim_i^2 s_2 \sim_i^2 t'_2$, and $V_D^2(d, t_2) \neq V_D^2(d, t'_2)$;
- Kv-Zag:* if $t_2 \sim_i^2 s_2 \sim_i^2 t'_2$, and $V_D^2(d, t_2) \neq V_D^2(d, t'_2)$ for some d then there exist $t_1, t'_1 \in S_1$ such that $t_1 \sim_i^1 s_1 \sim_i^1 t'_1$, and $V_D^1(d, t_1) \neq V_D^1(d, t'_1)$.

We write $\mathcal{M}_1, s_1 \stackrel{d}{\sim} \mathcal{M}_2, s_2$ iff there is a d -bisimulation between $\mathcal{M}_1$ and $\mathcal{M}_2$ linking s_1 and s_2 .

We can show d -bisimulation preserves $\mathbf{ELKv}$ formulas:

Theorem 24. If $\mathcal{M}_1, s_1 \stackrel{d}{\sim} \mathcal{M}_2, s_2$, then $\mathcal{M}_1, s_1 \equiv_{\mathbf{ELKv}} \mathcal{M}_2, s_2$.

Proof. Suppose that $\mathcal{M}_1, s_1 \stackrel{d}{\sim} \mathcal{M}_2, s_2$, we proceed by induction on the structure of $\mathbf{ELKv}$ formula ϕ . Here we only show the non-trivial case for $Kv_i d$.

Suppose $\mathcal{M}_1, s_1 \not\models Kv_i d$, then there exists t_1, t'_1 with $t_1 \sim_i^1 s_1 \sim_i^1 t'_1$ and $V_D^1(t_1, d) \neq V_D^1(t'_1, d)$. By *Kv-Zig*, there exist $t_2, t'_2 \in S_2$ such that $t_2 \sim_i^2 s_2 \sim_i^2 t'_2$, and $V_D^2(d, t_2) \neq V_D^2(d, t'_2)$. Therefore $\mathcal{M}_2, s_2 \not\models Kv_i d$.

The other direction can be proved similarly by using *Kv-Zag*. $\square$

Now consider the following two models (using $\circ$ and $\bullet$ for the objects assigned to d):

$$s : p \circ -1- \neg p \circ -1- p \bullet \quad s' : p \circ -1- \neg p \bullet$$

It is not hard to see that these two models are d -bisimilar linking s and s' . However, we can distinguish s and s' easily by a $\mathbf{PALKv}$ formula $[p]Kv_1 d$.

Based on this example and the fact that $\mathbf{PALKv}$ is an extension of $\mathbf{ELKv}$, we have the following result:

Theorem 25. $\mathbf{PALKv}$ is strictly more expressive than $\mathbf{ELKv}$.

The readers may recall a similar comparison in the context of (relativised) common knowledge between $\mathbf{ELC}$, $\mathbf{ELC}^r$, $\mathbf{PALC}$ and $\mathbf{PALC}^r$ in [van Benthem *et al.*, 2006] where $\mathbf{PALC}$ is strictly less expressive than $\mathbf{PALC}^r$. However, in our case the situation is different.

Theorem 26. $\mathbf{ELKv}^r$ is no more expressive than $\mathbf{PALKv}$.

Proof. Define a translation function $t : \mathbf{ELKv}^r \rightarrow \mathbf{PALKv}$ as follows (we only show the non-trivial clause):

$$t(Kv_i(\phi, d)) = K_i \neg t(\phi) \vee \hat{K}_i(t(\phi))Kv_i d$$

It is not hard to show that t can eliminate the $Kv_i(\phi, \cdot)$ operators while preserving the truth of formulas. $\square$

Now based on Theorem 26, the fact that $\mathbf{ELKv}^r$ and $\mathbf{PALKv}^r$ are equally expressive, and the fact that $\mathbf{PALKv}^r$ is clearly no less expressive than $\mathbf{PALKv}$, the following corollary is immediate:

Corollary 27. $\mathbf{PALKv}^r$, $\mathbf{PALKv}$ and $\mathbf{ELKv}^r$ are equally expressive.

7 Conclusion and Future work

In this paper, we proved that the system $\mathbf{PALKV}_p$ is not complete. On the other hand, $\mathbf{ELKV}_1^r$ is complete for single agent $\mathbf{ELKv}^r$. Based on this and Theorem 10, $\mathbf{ELKV}_1^r + !\text{ATOM} + !\text{NEG} + !\text{CON} + !\text{K} + !\text{Kv}^r$ is complete for $\mathbf{PALKv}_1^r$. We conjecture that $\mathbf{PALKv}_1^r$ is decidable, since a version of filtration technique should work to show a small model property as in normal modal logic. We leave it to a future occasion.

It is not very clear whether multi-agent $\mathbf{ELKv}^r$ can be completely axiomatized by the multi-agent version of $\mathbf{ELKV}_1^r$. Two main difficulties in the completeness proof are as follows:

1. The definition of R in the canonical model is to be revised: we may need to take the reflexive transitive closure of R to make it an equivalence relation.
2. The definition of $\sim_i^c$ also needs to be revised.

To see the second point, consider the following model:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \downarrow^{1,2} & & \downarrow^{1,2} \\ p, d \mapsto \circ & \text{---}1\text{---} & p, d \mapsto \bullet \end{array}$$

It is clear that these two worlds satisfy exactly the same set of $\mathbf{PALKv}^r$ formulas. However, it is impossible to embed this model in our previously defined canonical model, since these two worlds must be connected by $\sim_2$ if they have the same maximal consistent sets. We leave the multi-agent axiomatization and the applications of the new relativized Kv operator for future work.

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